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SUPREME COURT, STATE OP UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and LAWRENCE 
D. HUNTER, 
Defendants, 
KIM C. MOORE, 
Appellee. 
BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Appellant, Copper State Leasing Company, (hereinafter "Copper 
State") by and through its counsel of record, hereby submits this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. This Appeal is taken pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Supreme Court of Utah has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah 
Code Ann, 1953 as amended. 
2. This Appeal is from a dismissal with prejudice of 
Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to prosecute. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower Court abuse its discretion in dismissing 
Appellant's Complaint with prejudice, based upon Appellee's Motion 
1 
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to Dismiss? 
2. Does the sua sponte dismissal of Appellant's Complaint, 
with prejudice by the lower Court for failure to prosecute, 
constitute an abuse of discretion under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure? 
3. Was it a reversible error for the lower Court to enter 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order when timely 
objections had been filed thereto, without any response to the 
objections and without a hearing? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The standard of review of a dismissal by a lower Court, 
for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is an abuse of discretion standard. Wilson vs. Lambert, 
613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). 
2. The propriety of the entry of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and an Order, over objection and without hearing 
is a question of law subject to review for correctness, without 
deference to the Trial Court's legal conclusions. Barber vs. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of 
the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules or 
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him. After the 
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a 
jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law 
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as 
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trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the 
court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in 
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision 
and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as 
an adjudication upon the merits. 
Rule 4-504(1) and (2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
Statement of the Rule: (1) In all rulings by a court, 
counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling 
shall within fifteen days or within a shorter time as the 
court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, 
judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and 
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after 
service. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Copper State filed a Complaint on or about April 24, 1985 
against Carver Hunter, Inc., a corporation, Kim C. Moore, Randy J. 
Bushnell and Lawrence D. Hunter. The liability of the corporate 
Defendant was based upon a Commercial Lease Agreement. The 
individuals' liability was based upon guaranty of the Lease 
Agreement. Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, all the 
Defendants except Kim C. Moore filed bankruptcy petitions. No 
further action occurred in the District Court proceeding until an 
Order to Show Cause was filed by the Court on December 1, 198 6. 
This Order to Show Cause was stricken due to the pending 
bankruptcies. After Carver Hunter, Inc.'s bankruptcy was dismissed 
for failure to comply with the provisions of a confirmed Plan, new 
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counsel for Plaintiff filed an Entry of Appearance and filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter on November 19, 1990. 
Moore initially responded pro se through a series of motions and 
responses, including a Motion to Change Venue, Motion to Dismiss 
and Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, Moore 
retained counsel who filed additional pleadings on behalf of Moore, 
which were in essence duplicates of Defendant Moore's pro se 
responses and Motions. 
Prior to the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Defendant's Motion for Dismissal, the Court denied 
Moore's Motion for Change of Venue. Thereafter, at the hearing, 
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal was argued first. In ruling from 
the bench, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup dismissed the Plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Argument was 
not made thereafter on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for Defendant Moore prepared proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order. Counsel for Plaintiff 
objected to the proposed Findings. Without a hearing on 
Plaintiff's objection, the Court entered the proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order as prepared by counsel for Moore 
on April 3, 1991. As a result of the Court's rulings, Plaintiff 
has filed this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about April 24, 1985, a Complaint was filed against 
Carver-Hunter, Inc., a corporation, Kim C. Moore, Randy J. Bushnell 
and Lawrence D. Hunter. (R. 2 through 12). 
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2. The liability of the corporate Defendant was predicated 
on the execution of a Commercial Lease Agreement. (R. 4). 
3. The liability of the individual Defendants, including 
Appellee Kim C. Moore, was predicated upon the execution of 
guarantees of the aforementioned Lease Agreement. (R. 10). 
4. Appellee answered Plaintiff's Complaint on May 6, 1985. 
(R. 19). 
5. All other named Defendants filed bankruptcy. (R. 34). 
6. An Order to Show Cause was issued by the Court on 
December 1, 1986. (R. 33). 
7. On January 7, 1987, the Court's Order to Show Cause was 
stricken due to the pending bankruptcies. (R. 34 and 35). 
8. No action was taken by either party until Plaintiff filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 21, 1990. (R. 38) . 
9. On December 3, 1990, Appellee pro se, filed a response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and also requested a 
hearing on Defendant's long outstanding Motion for Change of Venue. 
(R. 70, 72 and 20). 
10. Appellee also filed a Motion to Dismiss. (A copy is 
attached as Exhibit MAM in the Addendum. This Motion has been 
supplemented to the Court record by Stipulation, as for some 
unexplained reason this Motion is not in the Court record.) 
11. Appellant responded to Defendant's Motions by filing a 
Memorandum in Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Reply Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental 
Affidavit of Chris Davis. (R. 75, 80 and 92). Appellant also 
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filed a Notice to Submit for Decision at the same time. (R. 87). 
12, Thereafter, Appellee retained counsel, who filed a series 
of additional pleadings as identified below, which are essentially 
duplicates of Moore's pro se responses. 
a. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue. 
(R. 101). 
b. Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 107). 
c. Affidavit of Kim C. Moore. (R. 121). 
d. Motion for Dismissal. (R. 124). 
e. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Dismissal. (R. 
126) . 
f. Motion for Decision and Oral Argument. (R. 99) . 
(Copies of the Motion for Dismissal, Memorandum in Support and 
Affidavit are attached hereto as Exhibit MB" to the Addendum). 
13. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a series of responsive 
pleadings as follows: 
a. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Change of Venue. (R. 130). 
b. Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 142). 
c. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Chris Davis in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 152) . 
d. Memorandum in Response to Defendant Kim C. Moore's 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. 154). 
e. Affidavit of Chris Davis in Support of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 164). (Copies of the Plaintiff's responsive pleadings to 
the Motion to Dismiss are attached as Exhibit "C". 
14. Oral argument on Copper State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was scheduled for March 
11, 1991. (R. 89). 
15. The Court ruled on Defendant's outstanding Motion for 
Change of Venue on February 1, 1991, denying it and allowing the 
litigation to continue (R. 90 and 170). 
16. At the hearing of March 11, 1991, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup dismissed Copper State's Complaint with prejudice for 
failure to prosecute. (R. 173). 
17. Based upon the request of Plaintiff's counsel for written 
Findings and Conclusions, counsel for Appellee prepared proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order, to memorialize 
the ruling of the Court. (R. 178 through 181) . Copies of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order are addended hereto 
as Exhibit "D". 
18. A timely objection was filed to the aforementioned 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on March 27, 1991. 
(R. 174-177) . A copy of Copper State's Objections is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "EM. 
19. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were 
entered by the Court on April 3, 1991, without a hearing on 
Plaintiff's objection. (R. 181). A copy of the lower Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order are attached hereto 
as Exhibit "F". 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is Copper State's position that the lower Court abused its 
discretion in dismissing its Complaint with prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. Copper State also believes the Court's entry of the 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order without a 
hearing upon Plaintiff's objection was a further abuse of 
discretion and unnecessarily prejudices Plaintiff in that the 
Findings do not accurately reflect the proceeding or the basis of 
the Court's Order. 
The dismissal of an action for failure to dismiss is an 
extreme remedy that should only be used by a trial court with 
caution. Intermountain Physical Medicine Associates vs. Micro-Dex 
Corporation, 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah App. 1987). The Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss was based upon laches, which is an equitable 
remedy. Defendant did not sufficiently support his claim that the 
doctrine of laches should be applied in this situation and 
therefore the lower Court abused its discretion if it relied upon 
the Defendant's Motion and Affidavit in dismissing Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
In the alternative, if the Court entered dismissal of 
Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice sua sponte, then this action 
was also an abuse of the Court's discretion. Plaintiff had no 
knowledge that the Court would consider dismissing this matter on 
its own Motion and rely on factors other than those set forth in 
Defendant's Motion and Memorandum. Further, the facts and 
circumstances of the case did not warrant a dismissal with 
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prejudice. 
Copper State was actively pursuing the matter at the time the 
Motion for Dismissal was filed and at the time of the Court's 
ruling and therefore the Dismissal was inappropriate. There was no 
showing by the Defendant or the Court that there has been any 
prejudice to the Defendant which could not be remedied and 
therefore the Court's Order of Dismissal was an abuse of 
discretion. 
Finally, the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order entered by the Court were entered over Plaintiff's Objection 
without a hearing in contravention to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. It is Copper State's position that the 
Findings, Conclusions and Order entered by the Court did not 
accurately reflect the Court's ruling from the bench and therefore 
denied Copper State the opportunity to have an accurate and 
complete record of the Court's decision, thereby creating error 
justifying reversal and remand to District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EFFECTS OF THE DELAY AS ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT DID NOT 
JUSTIFY DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 
The dismissal of Copper State's Complaint with prejudice was 
in error if the Court based its decision upon Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss alleged that it had 
been harmed by the delay in the prosecution of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. However, the grounds alleged by the Defendant were not 
sufficient to justify dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint with 
prejudice. In order to fully understand the minimal effects caused 
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by the delay and the insufficiency of the support for Defendant's 
Motion, it is necessary to quickly review the proceedings. 
As set forth in this Statement of Facts, subsequent to 
Defendant Kim C. Moore's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, no action 
in this matter before the District Court occurred until the Court's 
own Order to Show Cause was issued on December 1, 1986. (R. 33). 
In response to that Order, counsel for Copper State informed the 
Court of the pending bankruptcies of Kim C. Moore's co-defendants 
and requested that the matter not be dismissed. (R. 34) . 
Consequently, the Court ordered that the Order to Show Cause be 
stricken as a result of the bankruptcies. (R. 35) . No further 
action was taken in the District Court by either party until 
November 26, 1990 when a Notice of Appearance of successor counsel 
for Plaintiff was filed with the Court, contemporaneously with a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum and supporting Affidavits. 
(R. 36, 38, 40, 51 and 65). Thereafter, Defendant Kim C. Moore 
responded pro se to the Motion by filing an Answer to Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 70) , a Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit "A" in 
Addendum), Request for Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Change of 
Venue (R. 72) and Request for Hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 74). 
Thereafter, Copper State replied to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis that the Motion stated no legal authority, and 
was not supported by either a Memorandum or Affidavit in support of 
the statement set forth in the Motion. (R. 75) . Subsequent 
thereto, Defendant retained counsel who filed additional pleadings 
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in connection with Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Those include a 
Motion for Dismissal (R. 124), a Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Dismissal (R. 126) and Affidavit of Kim C. Moore (R. 121) . 
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal was based upon a theory of laches. 
The lower Court's ruling in dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint 
with prejudice states that it was based on Plaintiff's failure to 
prosecute. It is unclear whether this ruling is based upon 
Defendant's argument of laches or upon the Court's own theory 
concerning the matter. However, if it is based upon the 
Defendant's theory of laches, it is an abuse of the Court's 
discretion as there was not a sufficient showing for the 
application of the equitable doctrine of laches to dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 
As set forth in Defendant's Memorandum, his theory of laches 
was based on the following statement of fact: 
The Defendant has been prejudiced by the delay in that he 
can no longer locate documents and witnesses which are 
necessary to support his defense to the plaintiff's case. 
(R. 127). 
It should be noted that this statement is only in the 
Memorandum and is not supported in any way by the Affidavit of Kim 
C. Moore. (R. 121). Consequently, this unsupported statement is 
conclusory and has no evidentiary value whatsoever upon which the 
Court can rely in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Without any 
factual basis, the Court had no basis upon which to make its 
ruling. 
Further, the theory of laches does not apply as a basis for 
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dismissing an action when the conduct complained of occurred after 
filing of the action. The doctrine of laches applies as an 
equitable remedy to relieve a party from liability from conduct and 
unreasonable delay that occurred prior to the commencement of an 
action. It has often been referred to as an equitable statute of 
limitations. 
As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Patterson 
vs. Hewitt [citation omitted]. "Some degree of diligence 
in bringing suit is required under all systems of juris 
prudence." Just as the statute of limitations 
establishes the requisite degree for actions at law, so 
is laches the rule for equitable actions. ...as a result, 
while "in actions at law, the question of diligence is 
determined by the words of the statute..." in suits in 
equity the question is determined by the circumstances of 
each particular case. 
Adair vs. Hustace, 640 P.2d 294, 300 (Haw 1982). (See, also. City 
of Bothell vs. King County, 723 P.2d 547 (Wash. App. 1986)). 
Moore's Motion to Dismiss complains of delays which occurred 
subsequent to the filing of the Complaint. The equitable rule of 
laches does not apply in such situations. "The doctrine of laches 
is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims where an 
excessive amount of time has passed prior to the assertion of a 
claim." Schraft vs. Leis, 686 P.2d 685, 687 (Kan. 1984) (emphasis 
added). Similarly, the Supreme Court of the State of California 
stated "...the affirmative defense of laches requires unreasonable 
delay in bringing suit..." Miller vs. Eisenhower Medical Center, 
614 P.2d 258, 264 (Cal. 1980). (See, also. In Re Marriage of 
Sanborn, 777 P.2d 4 (Wash. App. 1989)). 
Even assuming that the doctrine of laches applies after the 
commencement of the case, the Defendant did not provide a 
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sufficient showing that all the elements of laches were present. 
The elements of laches were set forth in the case of Papanikolas 
vs. Suaarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1975) as 
follows: 
To constitute laches, two elements must be established 
(1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2) 
an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. 
Id. at 1260. 
Defendant Moore argued that the passage of time equated with 
lack of diligence. However, "...delay or lapse of time alone does 
not constitute laches". Bloomenthal vs. Concrete Constructors Co. 
of Albuquerque, Inc., 692 P.2d 50, 57 (N.M. App. 1984). (See, 
also, Moore vs. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831 (Kan. App. 1981)). Lack of 
diligence requires an unexplained and unreasonable delay which 
renders enforcement of Plaintiff's cause of action inequitable. 
Johnson vs. Estate of Shelton, 754 P.2d 828 (Mont. 1988). 
While there was certainly delay in this matter, the Defendant 
has pointed out no delay which was unexcused or due to a lack of 
diligence. Further, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response and 
supporting Affidavits (R. 154 and 164) clearly provide reasons for 
the delay. Those included the fact that Defendant Moore's co-
obligors filed bankruptcy. A further explanation of delay is the 
fact that Copper State had assigned its interest in the contract to 
a third party, Lease West, to collect on the obligation. After 
Copper State was placed into liquidation by the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions, the receiver/liquidator canceled the 
executory contract of Lease West and demanded back the assigned 
13 
accounts. Lease West refused to return the accounts and litigation 
was commenced to force the return of the accounts. Ultimately, 
this account was returned and Copper State began steps toward 
pursuing Moore, the sole remaining non-bankrupt Defendant. 
On the basis that there has been a reasonable explanation of 
the delays, coupled with the fact that Defendant made absolutely no 
showing of prejudice, the Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 
complaint was an abuse of discretion and should be overruled. 
In addition, it has been recognized that the Defendant has the 
same rights and obligations to proceed with litigation as does the 
Plaintiff. Even if the Court were to recognize the Defendant's 
unsupported factual statement that witnesses are no longer 
available, the Defendant certainly has had the opportunity to 
preserve evidence by the taking of depositions and performing other 
discovery to preserve evidence in his favor. Clearly, Rule 4-104, 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides that any party may 
certify a matter as ready for trial. Defendant having elected not 
to take any action in this case, cannot now complain that it has 
been prejudiced by the mere length of time it has taken Plaintiff 
to pursue the one non-bankrupt Defendant. 
Therefore, Copper State believes Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss 
was legally and factually insupportable and therefore provided no 
basis for the Court to make a ruling. Because of the Court's 
requirements to review all facts under the totality of the 
circumstances, Department of Social Services vs. Romero, 609 P.2d 
1323 (Utah 1980), the lower court abused its discretion in 
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dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. Therefore, this 
Court should overrule the Court's Order, deny Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and remand to the lower Court for consideration of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
WHEN AN ACTION IS BEING PURSUED IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The basis of the Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of 
action was for failure to prosecute. Though neither the Court's 
minute entry nor the Order entered by the Court specifically 
states, the Order was presumably based upon Rule 41(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which reads in relevant part as follows: 
Involuntary Dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of 
the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules or 
any order of court, the defendant may move for dismissal 
of an action or of any claim against him. ...Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision... operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
In the present matter, Appellee did not move the Court under 
Rule 41(b) to dismiss for failure to prosecute. As set forth in 
Point I above, Appellee's Motion to Dismiss was based upon laches. 
However, the Court dismissed Copper State's cause of action for 
failure to prosecute. 
As the Appellee did not bring his Motion on this basis, it is 
Copper State's belief that the Court relied on its own legal theory 
as the basis for its ruling. While the Court has the authority to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute, it must exercise this power only 
if there is no excuse for delay. Westinahouse El. Sup. Co. vs. 
Paul W. Larsen Con.. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). A dismissal 
on this basis must not be unreasonable or arbitrary and is subject 
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to review for abuse of discretion. £d. Further, there are certain 
factors to be considered. 
Some consideration should be given to conduct of both 
parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move the 
case forward and what they have done about it; and also 
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side; and most important, whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal. 
Id. at 879. 
Had these factors been considered by the lower court and been 
given the appropriate weight, Plaintiff's Complaint should not have 
been dismissed. Therefore, the Court's decision was an abuse of 
discretion and should be overruled. This is clear when the 
application of these factors in cases previously ruled on by this 
Court are examined. 
The Supreme Court in Westinahouse noted that the defendants in 
that case had not sought the Court's assistance to bring the matter 
to any sort of conclusion. I_d. The Court was "not impressed that 
the defendants themselves were overly diligent or manifest any 
particular haste in getting the pre-trial discovery procedures 
completed and on with the trial." .Id. The Supreme Court went on 
to overturn the dismissal for failure to prosecute stating: 
...[I]t is even more important to keep in mind that the 
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford 
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice 
between them. In conformity with that principle, the 
courts generally tend to favor granting relief from 
default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse 
unless it will result in substantial prejudice or 
injustice to the adverse party. It is our conclusion 
that the trial court failed to give proper weight to the 
higher priority and that under the circumstances 
described herein, the order of dismissal was an abuse of 
discretion. 
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Id. 
A similar result was reached in Johnson vs. Firebrand, Inc.r 
571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977). In the Firebrand case, the Court relied 
on three (3) factors. First, the Court noted that "neither party 
had any active interest in the matter for nearly four (4) years". 
Id. at 1369. This is comparable to the present matter in which 
neither party, including Appellee, took any action for a period of 
five (5) years. Second, the Court noted that new counsel had 
recently entered an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff after 
which the matter was reactivated. .Id. Again, this is comparable 
to the present action in which new counsel filed an appearance on 
behalf of Copper State on November 21, 1990 and filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment contemporaneously therewith. 
Finally, the Supreme Court in Firebrand relied on the fact 
that neither party explained their inactivity. In considering that 
factor, the Court stated: "Since either party could have brought 
the matter to a conclusion, it is difficult to see why the 
Plaintiff should be denied his claim...". Id. at 1369. In the 
present matter, Appellee has offered no explanation for his failure 
to take any action during the interim. Though he filed a Motion to 
Dismiss based upon laches, he filed no Affidavit in support 
thereof. Consequently, there is no evidentiary material in the 
record supporting any claim of prejudice or offering any 
explanation for Defendant's failure to take action. Copper State, 
on the contrary, was, as reflected by the record, involved in 
bankruptcy proceedings with all of the Appellee's co-defendants. 
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After examining the conduct of the parties, the Supreme Court in 
Firebrand overturned the dismissal stating: 
The conduct of all parties cannot be readily explained; 
and in view of the fact that new counsel caused the case 
to be activated, it seems the court abused its discretion 
in dismissing the case on a motion to dismiss that was 
filed at the same time as the answer. 
Id. at 1370. 
In the present matter, new counsel not only reactivated the 
case, but filed a Motion for Summary Judgment prior to the 
Defendant filing any Motion to Dismiss and well prior to the date 
the Court dismissed the matter sua sponte for failure to prosecute. 
During the interim between the filing of the two (2) potentially 
dispositive Motions and the scheduled hearing the Court even ruled 
on Appellee's outstanding Motion for Change of Venue, denying it, 
without any indication that the case was not being properly 
pursued. In light of the holding in Firebrand, the Third District 
Court's action constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
A more recent Utah case, Maxfield vs. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237 
(Utah App. 1989), reviews the foregoing cases and provides a 
thorough examination of factors which should be considered in a 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. The Court stated: 
The factors which we consider may include the following: 
1. The conduct of both parties; 
2. the opportunity each party has had to move the case 
forward; 
3. what each of the parties has done to move the case 
forward; 
4. what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side; and 
5. most important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. 
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Id. at 239. 
In the Maxfield case, the dismissal for failure to prosecute 
was upheld. However, there is a clear factual distinction between 
Maxfield and the present matter. The Court of Appeals noted in 
Maxfield that the defendants had filed four (4) separate Motions 
indicating their readiness for trial. Id. at 240. The Court 
further noted that the defendants pursued discovery, including the 
taking of depositions, and were forced to file Motions to Compel 
against the plaintiff. Consequently, it appears as if the 
plaintiff in Maxfield was involved in a course of conduct amounting 
to intentional, or at least unexcused, delay. 
Further, it was noted in the Maxfield case that there was 
evidence that the defendant7s witnesses had become unavailable in 
the nine (9) years the case was pending. In the present matter, 
there is no evidence that the Appellee suffered any prejudice. A 
statement to that effect is made in his Memorandum (R. 127) , but 
that statement is unsupported by any reference to an Affidavit or 
any other portion of the record. Of course, as a result of the 
dismissal in the present action, Copper State has suffered the 
extreme prejudice of losing its opportunity to have its action 
heard on the merits, creating the greater injustice that the Court 
in Maxfield said should be avoided. 
There have been similar decisions by Federal Courts in 
reviewing dismissals for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rulings of 
Federal Courts are generally considered persuasive authority on the 
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interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, due to the 
fact that they were patterned thereafter. Winegar vs. Slim Olson. 
Inc., 252 P.2d 205 (Utah 1953); Wilson vs. Lambert. 613 P.2d 765 
(Utah 1980). Federal Courts, while citing numerous factors to 
consider, tend to rely very heavily on the proposition that a 
matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute when it is 
currently being actively pursued. Applebaum vs. Ceres Land Co.
 P 
546 F.Supp. 17 (1981). (See, also, Rawlins vs. United States, 286 
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961)). 
This proposition is also supported by state courts of 
neighboring jurisdictions. 
When the plaintiff has resumed work on the case and is 
diligently prosecuting at the time the motion is filed, 
the motion should not be granted since the policy 
favoring resolution of a case on its merits is more 
compelling than the rationale of Rule 41(b) which is to 
prevent unreasonable delay. 
Timber Tracts vs. Fergus. Elec. Co-Op., 753 P.2d 854 (Mont. 1988). 
This rule was similarly stated by the Supreme Court of Nevada 
in Spiegelman vs. Gold Dust Texaco, 539 P.2d 1216 (Nevada 1975), 
wherein the Supreme Court of Nevada stated: 
However, if the claim is presently being prosecuted with 
diligence it cannot be dismissed because at some earlier 
time plaintiff did not act diligently. 
Id. at 1218 (citing: 9 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Civil §2370 at 204). 
In the present matter, Copper State was actively pursuing the 
matter at the time it was dismissed by the Court. A Notice of 
Entry of Appearance of Counsel on behalf of Copper State was filed 
with the Court on November 26, 1990. That same date, Copper 
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State's Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting Memorandum and 
Affidavit were filed. Defendant responded to that Motion and 
Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum and a Notice to Submit for 
decision all of which were filed with the Court on or prior to 
December 5, 1990. Consequently, a fully dispositive motion was 
before the Court over four (4) months prior to the time the Court 
dismissed the Plaintiff's action sua sponte. 
Additional evidence of the lower Court's abuse of discretion 
is its failure to consider imposing on Plaintiff lesser sanctions 
for the alleged prejudice suffered by the Defendant. (R. 174) . 
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, overturned a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), for the simple 
reason that the District Court failed to examine less severe 
sanctions. 
However, we are compelled to vacate the dismissal with 
prejudice because nothing in the record indicates that 
less severe sanctions were considered or, if considered, 
deemed futile. 
McCloud River R. Co. vs. Sabine River Forest, 735 F. Supp. 879, 883 
(1984) . 
In the matter presently before this Court, less severe 
sanctions were not considered, even though proposed by Plaintiff. 
(R. 174). Based upon the controlling factors that should have been 
considered by the Court, the fact that the matter was being 
actively pursued and because the Court refused to consider lesser 
sanctions, dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice was an 
abuse of discretion. Copper State requests this Court to overrule 
the Court's Order and remand for consideration of Plaintiff's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, 
III. ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND AN ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL, WITHOUT REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS 
THERETO CONSTITUTES REVERSAL ERROR 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a tentative Order 
were prepared by Appellee's counsel and served on Appellant's 
counsel on March 22, 1991. Thereafter, on March 27, 1991 Copper 
State filed objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law alleging their mis-characterization of the 
proceedings below. (Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Order and Objection are addended hereto as Exhibits "D" and 
"E"). Such objections are permitted pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration which reads in relevant part 
as follows: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, 
or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file 
with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and order 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objection shall be submitted 
to the court and counsel within five days after service. 
(Emphasis added). 
The record establishes that Copper State,s objections were 
properly and timely filed with the Court under Rule 4-504. Though 
the rule does not specifically state that a party filing such 
objections is entitled to a hearing thereon, this can be reasonably 
inferred from the fact that a right to object, without a right to 
those objections being heard, is meaningless. Further, no response 
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was ever filed by the Appellee to Plaintiff's objections. 
Nevertheless, with no response in the file to Copper State's 
objections and without any hearing on those objections, the Court 
signed the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
entered the Order dismissing Plaintiff's cause of action on April 
3, 1991. Copper State was thereby denied the right to have the 
Court's full decision making process made part of the record. The 
entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
constitutes reversible error and a second basis justifying reversal 
of the Order of Dismissal of the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Kim Moore's Motion to Dismiss based upon laches was 
insufficient justification for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint with prejudice. Laches is not an appropriate theory to 
dismiss a cause of action when the conduct complained of occurs 
subsequent to the filing of the Complaint. Further, there is no 
evidence before the Court of any prejudice to the Defendant. 
Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances before the 
Court, it was an abuse of the lower Court's discretion to dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, thereby doing injustice to 
the Plaintiff by denying it an opportunity to have this matter 
fully considered. 
If dismissal of Copper State's cause of action was done sua 
sponte, such action by the Court constitutes an abuse cf 
discretion. Copper State was actively pursuing its cause of action 
having recently filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel and Motion 
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for Summary Judgment. That Motion, which would have been fully 
dispositive, had been fully briefed by the parties and was ready 
for decision of the Court at the time of the dismissal. 
Plaintiff's Motion was scheduled for hearing on the date the Court 
dismissed the action sua sponte for failure to prosecute pursuant 
to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This action 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Though there had occurred 
certain delay, that delay was explained by Copper State. There is 
no evidence in the record of any kind of contumacious conduct or 
intentional delay on the part of Copper State. Similarly, the 
Appellee took no action to bring this matter to a conclusion. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the record of any prejudice to the 
Appellee as a result of the delay. Under these circumstances, 
dismissal of Copper State's cause of action for failure to 
prosecute was a clear abuse of discretion, especially since the 
lower Court did not consider lesser sanctions. 
Similarly, the District Court's entry of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and an Order which were prepared by counsel for 
the respondent, without a hearing on Copper State's objections 
thereto, constitutes a second error of law justifying the relief 
sought. 
Therefore, Copper State Leasing Company respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court dismissing Copper State's cause of action and that this 
matter be remanded to the District Court for consideration of 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment awarding Appellant its 
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costs and fees. 
DATED this if day of September, 1991. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
M/frk (s. Swan 
Attorney for Appellant 
Copper State Leasing Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ///^fr day of September, 1991, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert A. Echard 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kim C. Moore 
632 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
/#/fi*X ^J^^X/ 
CS893148.C91 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Kim C. Moore-Defendant 
4950 Quail Lane 
Ogden, UT 84403 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY ) 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. C85-2626 
Kim C. Moore, et.al. ) 
Defendants ) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant, Kim C. Moore, represented by himself hereby 
moves the court to dismiss this action based upon the 
following: 
(1) Five and one-half years have elapsed since 
Plaintiff filed its complaint during which time it made no 
efforts to pursue its action until its recent motion for 
Summary Judgement. 
(2) It is 'unconscionable' and probably against 
'public policy* for Plaintiff to subject Defendant to 
the protracted uncertainties and mental stress of such 
needless delays. 
(3) The Court issued its own Order To Show Cause in 
December of 1986 as to why this case should not be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff's former 
counsel responded with its own letter to the Court stating 
that they wished to proceed immediately and that the case 
not be dismissed. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiff spent an additional four years of 
inaction after submitting the request for non-dismissal 
and vowing to proceed immediately. 
It should be noted that Defendant did not receive 
notice of this Order To Show Cause and was unaware of it 
until approximately three weeks ago. Although Defendant 
has always represented himself in this matter, the notice 
was apparently erroneously mailed to Counsel for the other 
Defendants who has never represented Defendant and did 
not notify defendant of the Order. Consequently, 
Defendant was unable to address Plaintiff's request. 
(4) After this protracted period of inaction, 
Defendant is likely to be in a prejudiced position 
inasmuch as he can no longer locate witnesses in support 
of his defenses including those in a contemplated 
Amendment of Answer. 
Wherefore, Defendant asks that this action be / 
d ismissed . 
Dated this 28th day of November, 1990 ^ < ^ T 
{Cim C. Moore-Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of November, 
1990, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to 
be served upon the following by placing the same in the 
United States mails, postage paid and addressed to: 
Mark S. Swan 
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C. 
311 South State Street Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paqe 3 of 3 Motion to Dismis 
EXHIBIT »B» 
JWV OFFICES 
DLEY, ECHARD 
&WARD 
5 25TH STREET 
DEN, UTAH 84401 
[801) 621-3317 
X (801) 621-3340 
3)\^ 
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
801-621-3317 
Fax: 801-621-3340 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and 
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
COMES NOW the defendant, Kim C. Moore, and moves the 
court for a dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint for failing to 
prosecute and on the theory of latches as more specifically set 
forth in the memorandum of the defendant attached hereto. 
DATED this /f-day of December, 1990. 
R'OBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
Kim C. Moore 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR DISMISSAL was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
)FFICES 
r
, ECHARD 
/ARD 
-I STREET 
JTAH 84401 
21-3317 
) 621-3340 
/ y day of December, 1990 to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111. 
SECRETARY/ 
JWV OFFICES 
DLEY, ECHARD 
&WARD 
5 25TH STREET 
DEN, UTAH 84401 
(801) 621-3317 
X (801) 621-3340 
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
801-621-3317 
Fax: 801-621-3340 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and 
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
COMES NOW the defendant, Kim C. Moore, and submits the 
following memorandum in support of his Motion to Dismiss on the 
doctrine of latches or failure to prosecute. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. A Complaint in this action was signed on the 23rd 
day of April, 1985, and served upon the defendant, Kim C. Moore, 
on April 29, 1985. 
2. No action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint, 
and in December of 1986 the court issued its own Order to Show 
Cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to 
[prosecute. The plaintiff, through its counsel, requested the 
court not dismiss the action and indicated that the case would be 
immediately prosecuted. 
iFFICES 
, ECHARD 
A^RD 
I STREET 
TAH 84401 
21-3317 
621-3340 
3. No action was taken from December of 1986 until the 
motions which have been recently filed in this matter on 
approximately November of 1990. 
4. The defendant has been prejudice by the delay in 
that he can no longer locate documents and witnesses which are 
necessary to support his defense to the plaintiff's case. 
ARGUMENT 
Black's Law Dictionary, under the terms "laches/1 states 
as follows: 
'Doctrine of laches, f is based upon maxim that 
equity aids the vigilant and not those who 
slumber on their rights. It is defined as 
neglect to assert right or ; ;aim which, taken 
together with lapse of time and other 
circumstances, cause prejudice to adverse 
party, operates as a bar in court of equity... 
The Montana Court in the case of Castillo v. Franks, 690 
P. 2d 427 (Mont. 1984), stated that the purpose of laches is to 
discourage stale demands and that the Court would refuse to 
interfere where there had been a gross laches in prosecuting 
rights or where long acquiescence in asserting of adverse rights 
had occurred. 
The Utah Court in the case of Papanikolas v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), stated as follows: 
. . . Laches is not mere delay, but delay that 
works a disadvantage to another. To 
constitute laches, two elements must be 
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the 
part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant 
owing to such lack of diligence. Although 
lapse of time is an essential part of laches, 
the length of time must depend on the 
VW OFFICES 
LEY, ECHARD 
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circumstances of each case, for the propriety 
of refusing a claim is equally predicted upon 
the gravity of the prejudice suffered by 
defendant and the length of plaintiff's delay. 
. . . The existence of laches is one to be 
determined primarily by the trial court; and 
reviewing courts will not interfere with the 
exercise of the trial court's discretion in 
the matter, unless it appears that a manifest 
injustice has been done, or the decision 
cannot reasonably be found to be supported by 
the evidence. . . 
The Utah Court has restated the elements of laches in the cases 
of Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah, 1980), and Utah 
Department of Transportation v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 751 
P.2d 271 (Utah App., 1988). The Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1987), stated that the 
distinction between law and equity had long ago been abolished in 
the State of Utah, and that equitable defenses applied in actions 
at law and in actions based upon equity. 
The defendant believes that this is a proper case in 
which to apply the doctrine of laches or the failure to prosecute. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, this case is approximately 
five and one-half years old. The court previously, on its own 
motion, issued an Order to Show Cause to dismiss in December of 
1986. At that time, the plaintiff indicated that it would 
immediately proceed with the case. However, the plaintiff has 
failed to do so and took no further action in this matter until 
approximately November of 1990. The defendant is at a 
disadvantage in this matter because he can no longer locate many 
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of his documents and/or the witnesses he will need to defend 
against the case. 
It should be noted that other affidavits and motions 
filed before the court demonstrate that the plaintiff did not at 
any time send notice to the defendant concerning the Lease being 
in default or demand under the Guaranty Agreement signed by the 
defendants. The course of action by the plaintiff from the 
beginning has been to act in a dilatory manor. The same manner 
has been perpetuated throughout the term of this lawsuit. 
Consequently, the defendant respectfully requests that the 
plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed and that the defendant be 
granted an oral argument on this motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /P day of December, 1990. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
Kim C. Moore 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this /y day of December, 1990 to Mark 
S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South 
State, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84402-1850 
801-621-3317 
Fax: 801-621-3340 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and 
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIM C. MOORE 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
KIM C. MOORE, being first duly sworn upon his oath and 
having personal knowledge, deposes and says: 
1. That your affiant is a defendant in the above 
entitled action. 
2. That on about October 10, 1980, a Lease Agreement 
was entered into between Carver Hunter, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
and Copper State Leasing Company. That on the same date, your 
affiant signed a Guaranty Agreement. Copies of said documents are 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
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3. That at no time was your affiant given any 
notification under the terms of the Lease that the Lease Agreement 
was in default as required by Paragraph 21 of the Lease Agreement. 
4. That at no time was your affiant given any 
notification, written or otherwise, of a demand that he pay under 
the terms of his Guaranty Agreement. 
5. That as of the 10th of October, 1980, your affiant 
resided at 4950 Quail Lane, Ogden, Utah. During the early part 
of 1983, your affiant moved to 1717 Esquire, Grand Prarie, Texas. 
That your affiant, during the early part of 1983, notified the 
plaintiff of his address in Texas. 
6. That your affiant did not at any time receive the 
letter from the plaintiff dated October 4, 1983, a copy of which 
is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A. 
7. That at no time prior to the filing of the 
Complaint and Summons in this matter was your affiant notified 
that the Lease Agreement was in default or notified that the 
plaintiff had repossessed the property and proposed to sell it. 
DATED this jj^L d aY o f December, 1990, 
SUBSCR 
December, 1990 
KIM C. MOORE, Defendant 
SWORN TO before me this / ^ day of 
• ^ 
NOTARY^PUBLIC, Ogden/ Utah 
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My Commission Expires : ^ T ^ " / 5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF KIM C. MOORE was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this /y day of December, 1990 to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. 
Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
SECRETARY U 
EXHIBIT "C" 
Mark S. Swan - 3873 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
311 South State 
Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Copper State Leasing Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
Corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and LAWRENCE 
D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT KIM C. MOOREfS 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
PLAINTIFF, Copper State Leasing Company (hereinafter "Copper 
State11) , by and through its counsel of record, Mark S. Swan of the 
law firm RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C., hereby submits this 
Memorandum in Response to Defendant Kim C. Moore's Motion to 
Dismiss. This Memorandum is supported by the Affidavit of Chris 
Davis filed contemporaneously herewith. 
FACTS 
1. All of Defendant Moore's co-obligors have filed 
bankruptcy. (See, Affidavit of Chris Davis in support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at Paragraphs 5 and 6). 
2. Plaintiff Copper State Leasing was not in possession of 
the Carver-Hunter, Inc. Lease and the Guaranty of Defendant Kim C. 
Moore from August, 1986 through Spring, 1990. Said Lease Agreement 
was in the possession of a corporation, Lease West, and Copper 
State Leasing Company was forced to pursue a legal action in order 
to force Lease West to return this Lease Agreement to Copper State 
Leasing Company. (See, Affidavit of Chris Davis in Support of 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss at Paragraphs 3 through 6). 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENSE OF LACHES WAS WAIVED 
Pursuant to Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
defense is waived if not properly raised. "A party waives all 
defenses and objections which he does not raise either by motion 
as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer." The defense of laches was not raised in the Defendants' 
Answer. Therefore, said defense is waived unless it was raised by 
Motion as provided in Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 12(b), sets forth those defenses which a party may raise by 
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Motion as follows: 
1. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
2. Lack of jurisdiction over the person; 
3. Improper venue; 
4. Insufficiency of process; 
5. Insufficiency of service of process; 
6. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted; and 
7. Failure to join an indispensable party. 
Defendants' present Motion to Dismiss, which is based upon the 
affirmative defense of laches, fits none of the aforementioned 
categories. Therefore, the defense of laches was waived pursuant 
to Rule 12(h). There being no cognizable legal basis for the 
motion, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 
THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE 
The defense of laches is not available to the Defendant. The 
Doctrine of Laches applies to unreasonable delay which occurs prior 
to the commencement of action. It has often be likened to the 
equitable version of a Statute of Limitations. 
As noted by the United State Supreme Court in Paterson 
vs. Hewitt, [citation omitted] "Some degree of diligence 
in bringing suit is required under all systems of juris 
prudence." Just as the Statute of Limitations 
establishes the requisite degree for actions at law, so 
is laches the rule for equitable actions. ...as a 
result, while ,fin actions at law, the question of 
diligence is determined by the words of the statute... 
in suits in equity the ^ .question is determined by the 
circumstances of each particular case. 
Adair vs. Hustace, 640 P.2d 294, 300 (Hawaii 1982). 
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This rule has been similarly stated by the Court of Appeals 
of Washington. "Where no express statute of limitations has been 
established by legislative act or Court rule, the test is whether 
is brought within a reasonable time". City of Bothell vs. King 
County, 723 P.2d 547, 550 (Wash. App. 1986). In the present 
matter, Defendants complain of delays which occurred after 
Plaintiff commenced the present action. Initially, Plaintifffs 
cause of action against Defendant is on contract and is therefore 
an action at law. It is not an equity action and therefore the 
Doctrine of Laches does not apply. Since Plaintiff has brought the 
action within the applicable statute of limitations, the case 
should not be dismissed. Secondly, since a Statute of Limitations 
would have no bearing on such delays after the commencement of the 
action, and similarly, the Doctrine of Laches has no such 
application. 
The rule that Laches applies only to delays occurring prior 
to commencement of an action is widespread. "The Doctrine of 
Laches is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims where 
an excessive amount of time has passed prior to the assertion of 
a claim11. Schraft vs. Leis, 686 P.2d 685, 687 (Kan. 1984). 
(Emphasis added). The rule.^was similarly stated by the Supreme 
Court of the State of California in Miller vs. Eisenhower Medical 
Center, 614 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1980), in which the Court stated "As we 
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pointed out in Conti vs. Board of Civil Service Commissioners 
[citation omitted], the affirmative defense of laches requires 
unreasonable delay in bringing suit...'1. Id. at 264 (Emphasis 
added). Finally, MTo establish laches, the Defendant has the 
burden of showing that... (2) there was an unreasonable delay in 
commencing the action;..." In Re Marriage of Sandborn, 777 P.2d 
4, 6 (Wash. App. 1989). (Emphasis added). Thus, any delays 
occurring after the commencement of this action, could not 
constitute the basis for a defense of laches. 
Even those cases cited by Defendant, in support of his Motion, 
deal with delays which occurred prior to commencement ot an action. 
1n Papanikolas Bros. Ent. vs. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. , 5 3 5 P. 2d 
1256 (Utah 1975), the delay of which the defendant complained 
occurred prior to commencement of the action. "Defendants assert 
that this failure to file the action (18 months after the station 
was completed) constituted laches". £d. at 1260. (Emphasis 
added). The same is true in Leaver vs. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 
1980), where the Court stated "...having placed Defendants on 
notice of the controversy that existed, certainly equity placed no 
further duty upon plaintiffs to immediately file a lawsuit..." 
Id., at 1264. (Emphasis added). Again, the delay in question was 
delay in the filing of a lawsuit, not the prosecution thereafter. 
Finally, in Utah Department of Transportation vs. Reagan Outdoor 
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Advertising, Inc. , 751 P.2d 271 (Utah App. 1988), the delay in 
question was a ten (10) year delay on the part of the Utah 
Department of Transportation enforcing the removal of certain signs 
which were erected in violation of the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act. Again, post-commencement of action delay is not the issue. 
THE ELEMENTS OF LACHES ARE LACKING 
The Utah Supreme Court has supplied us with one (1) definition 
for laches. 
To constitute laches, two elements must be established: 
(1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2) 
an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. 
Papanikolas vs. Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P. 2d 1236, 12 60 
(Utah 1975). 
However, "...delay or lapse of time alone does not constitute 
laches..." Blumenthal vs. Concrete Constructors Co. of 
Albuquergue, Inc., 692 P.2d 50, 57 (N.M. App. 1984). Mere passage 
of time is not enough to invoke the Doctrine of Laches. Moore vs. 
Phillips, 627 P.2d 831 (Kan. App. 1981). Before the Doctrine of 
Laches may apply, there must be an unexplained and unreasonable 
delay which would render enforcement of a Plaintiff's right 
inequitable. Johnson vs. Estate of Shelton, 754 P.2d 828 (Mont. 
1988) . 
Though there has been certain delay in this matter, which 
occurred after the commencement of the action, that delay is 
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reasonable and can be explained. 
In August, 1986, Copper State contracted with a third party, 
Lease West, to collect certain of their contracts, including the 
Carver-Hunter obligation guaranteed by Defendant Moore. Upon the 
failure of Lease West to fulfill its contractual obligations, 
Copper State terminated that contract. However, Lease West refused 
to return the accounts. Thereafter, Copper State was forced to 
commence legal action against Lease West in order to obtain 
possession of the accounts. Ultimately, Copper State prevailed in 
the aforementioned action and ultimately obtained possession of the 
Carver-Hunter account in Spring, 1990. Therefore, this account was 
out of the possession and beyond the control Plaintiff for 
approximately three and a half (3 1/2) years. 
Further, one of the primary causes of delay in the present 
action has been the sequential bankruptcy of each and every one of 
Defendant's co-obligors. Plaintiff was precluded, by operation of 
the Automatic Stay of the Bankruptcy Court, from proceeding against 
said co-obligors. However, the outcome of the aforementioned 
bankruptcies and the distribution of assets therein, had a bearing 
on the amount of Plaintiff's damages, and any distributions made 
from the bankruptcy estates of the co-obligors would only operate 
to benefit Defendant Moore in that said distributions would reduce 
the amount due and owing. Thus, Defendant Moore stood only to 
7 
benefit from those delays. 
Finally, the only prejudice which the Defendant alleges he has 
suffered as a result of the delays is his ability to preserve and 
present evidence. However, the Defendant has the same rights under 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, to take depositions and conduct 
discovery and thereby preserve evidence, as Plaintiff. Further, 
if the Defendant failed to exercise his rights under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure to preserve evidence, such a failure should not 
enure to his benefit. Similarly, Defendant has the same right as 
Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 4-104, Utah Code gj Judicial 
Administration, to certify the matter ready for trial. "When a 
civil case is at issue, any party, not in default as provided in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may file a written Certification 
of Readiness for Trial". Thus, Defendant is under the same 
obligation as Plaintiff to move the matter to trial. Had Defendant 
desired to bring this matter to a conclusion prior to the 
resolution of the aforementioned bankruptcies of his co-obligors, 
he was free to do so. Defendant elected not to do so, and should 
not now be heard to complain. 
CONCLUSION 
Only certain defenses may be raised by a motion. Laches is 
not one of those defenses. Therefore, having not been raised in 
Defendants Answer, the defense is waived. However, even if the 
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defense were not waived, it is not applicable to delays which occur 
after the commencement of an action. The Doctrine of Laches 
corresponds in equity to the statute of limitations. It applies 
only to delays which occur prior to commencement of an action. 
Therefore, it is not applicable to this case. Finally, even if it 
were applicable, the elements of laches are not present. The delay 
which has occurred in this matter is not the responsibility of 
Plaintiff. Further, the delay which occurred was reasonable under 
the circumstances. Finally, any prejudice which the Defendant may 
have suffered is not the result of the delays, but rather the 
result of Detendant's failure to exercise his rights under the 
Rules of Civil Procedure to preserve evidence. 
THEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this jf^^day of December, 1990. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
\nar)i S. Swan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Copper State Leasing Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 < 5 T day of December, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Robert A. Echard 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
635 - Twenty-Fifth Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant 
Kim C. Moore 
Ml ft VA' 
CS891728.C90 
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Mark S. Swan - 3873 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
311 South State 
Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Copper State Leasing Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s , 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
Corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and LAWRENCE 
D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS DAVIS 
IN SUPPORT OF PIJWNTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Chris Davis, being first duly sworn, depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I am the Operations Manger for Copper State Leasing 
Company, (hereinafter "Copper State"), and have been at all times 
relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint herein and Defendants1 Motion to 
Dismiss. 
2. In my capacity of Operations Manager of Copper State, I 
am personally familiar with the business records of Copper State 
Leasing Company as they relate to the lease obligations of Carver-
Hunter, Inc., and the Guaranty obligations of Defendant Kim C. 
Moore. 
3. On or about August 26, 1986, Copper State Leasing Company 
contracted with a corporation named Lease West, for the collection 
of certain of Copper State's accounts. Said accounts included the 
lease of Carver-Hunter, Inc. 
4. During or about the month of November, 1987, Copper State 
Leasing terminated its contract with Lease West. However, Lease 
West refused to return accounts to Copper State Leasing, including 
the lease of Carver-Hunter, Inc. 
5. Thereafter, a legal action was commenced in order to 
compel Lease West to return the Copper State accounts to Copper 
State. In the aforementioned action, a Motion was filed on 
September 21, 1989 to compel Lease West to return accounts to 
Copper State, including the Carver-Hunter lease. 
6. On or about January 24, 1990, the aforementioned Motion 
was granted, and during the? months thereafter, Copper State's 
accounts, including the lease of Carver-Hunter, Inc. was returned 
to Copper State Leasing Company. 
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Further, Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this ,$?/ day of December, 1990. 
Cpris Davis 
^ 
1990, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ ^  day of December, 
M!c?»/l?«'~ BAKER I 
L_ _3 *J*->— 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
\1 -y ^ 'p, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 : y r day of December, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Robert A. Echard 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
635 - Twenty-Fifth Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant 
Kim C. Moore 
C S 8 9 1 7 2 8 . c 9 0 
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EXHIBIT »D" 
*W OFFICES 
LEY, ECHARD 
&WARD 
25TH STREET 
EN, UTAH 84401 
01) 621-3317 
(801) 621-3340 
'/ 
ir 
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
801-621-3317 
Fax: 801-621-3340 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and 
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00 
a.m. The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark 
S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and 
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court having 
heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and 
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the 
premises; now therefore, makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
iFFICES 
, ECHARD 
A^RD 
I STREET 
TAH 64401 
21-3317 
621-3340 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Complaint in this action was filed in April of 
1985 seeking to collect from the defendant, Kim C. Moore, pursuant 
to an agreement guarantying a lease between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, Carver Hunter, Inc. The plaintiff had repossessed the 
property which was security for the lease and sought to obtain a 
deficiency judgment against Kim C. Moore with interest at the rate 
of 18 percent per annum, 
2. On the 1st day of December, 1986, an Order to Show 
Cause was issued by the court requiring the parties to show cause 
why the Complaint should not be dismissed for failing to prosecute 
and a hearing on said motion was set for January 7, 1987. 
3. The plaintiff wrote a letter to the court dated 
December 15, 1986, in which the plaintiff committed itself to 
proceed with the case as soon as possible and with due diligence. 
4. Thereafter, no change was made in the pleadings and 
no further action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint until the 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 19, 
1990. The court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment could 
have been filed as of January of 1987 and that nothing changed 
between 1987 and 1990 as between the parties. 
5. The lease called for interest at the rate of 18 
percent per annum and since 1986 has more than doubled; thereby 
causing additional cost and expense to the defendant if a judgment 
were to be obtained against him. 
*W OFFICES 
•LEY, ECHARD 
&WARD 
25TH STREET 
EN, UTAH 84401 
101) 621-3317 
: (801) 621-3340 
6. The plaintiff has sought to excuse its delay in 
prosecuting this case because of a bankruptcy that had been filed 
by other named defendants. Kim C. Moore did not file a bankruptcy 
and there was no federal stay order prohibiting the plaintiff from 
proceeding with its case in a timely manner. 
7. The plaintiff contends that it had assigned or 
transferred its right in the lease, which is the subject matter 
of this Complaint, to Lease West from August of 1986 to 1990. If 
that representation is true, then the lease had been assigned 
prior to the December 1, 1986 Order to Show Cause issued by this 
court and the December 15, 1986 letter from the plaintiff agreeing 
to proceed expeditiously on its case. Consequently, the court 
finds that this fact, if true, does not justify the plaintiff in 
failing to prosecute its case. 
8. The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to 
timely prosecute its case and therefore the plaintiff's Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
9. The court does not deal with the issues raised in 
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; that motion being 
moot in light of the court's ruling on the defendant's Motion for 
Dismissal. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice for failing to proceed with the prosecution of its case 
in a timely manner. 
(FF1CES 
, ECHARD 
kRD 
I STREET 
TAH 84401 
21-3317 
I 621-3340 
2. The court does not rule on~ the issues raised by the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the same having become 
moot by reason of the court's dismissal of the action for failing 
to prosecute. 
DATED this day of March, 1991. 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned 
attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the 
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this ST&L day of March, 1991. 
'ROBERT A. EC! 
Attorney for Defendant Moore 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this QJQ_ day of March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and 
Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State, 
Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
SECRETARY (J & iT i"-
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U ECHARD 
VARD 
H STREET 
JTAH 84401 
J21-3317 
) 621-3340 
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
801-621-3317 
Fax: 801-621-3340 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and 
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00 
a.m. The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark 
S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and 
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court having 
heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and 
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the 
premises; now therefore, 
WV OFFICES 
LEY, ECHARD 
fcWARO 
25TH STREET 
":N, UTAH 84401 
D1) 621-3317 
(801) 621-3340 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's cause of 
action is dismissed with prejudice for failing to prosecute in a 
timely manner. 
DATED this day of March, 1991. 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned 
attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing 
ORDER to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup for his signature upon the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed 
to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern 
yourself accordingly. 
DATED this ^ f A day of March, 1991. 
/ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant Moore 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^^L day of 
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March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 
84111. 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
Mark S. Swan - 3873 
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
311 South State 
Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Copper State Leasing Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, : 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
Corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and LAWRENCE : 
D. HUNTER, Civil No. C85-2626 
Defendants. Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Copper State Leasing Company, by and 
through its undersigned counsel, Mark S. Swan of the law firm 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C, and pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, hereby objects to the proposed 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law prepared by the attorney 
for the Defendant and submitted on March 22, 1991. This objection 
is based upon the fact that the Findings of Fact do not accurately 
reflect the findings of the Court at the hearing held on March 11, 
1991 at 10:00 a.m. The specific objections are as follows: 
1. Plaintiff objects to Finding of Fact No. 3 in that the 
letter was from Plaintiff's predecessor counsel, and not from 
Plaintiff. Furthermore, the undersigned attorney and current 
counsel for the Plaintiff has not been able to review the Court's 
file and look at the reported letter and has not been able to 
determine whether the language is as represented in the Findings 
of Fact. 
2. Plaintiff objects to Finding of Fact No. 6. The 
inference of the second sentence of that paragraph suggests that 
Plaintiff argued that the bankruptcy prohibited Plaintiff from 
pursuing Kim C. Moore. Plaintiff has never argued that position 
but has only argued that the effect of the bankruptcy was relevant 
to the issue of damages and prevented Plaintiff from establishing 
a liquidated damages figure as against Defendant Kim C. Moore. 
Consequently, a correct characterization of Plaintiff's position 
regarding one of the reasons for delay should be set-out in the 
Findings of Fact. 
3. Plaintiff objects to the proposed Findings in Paragraph 
No. 7. No representation has been made nor has the Court found 
that there was an assignment of the lease prior to the December 1, 
1986 Order to Show Cause. In fact, Plaintiff argued that the 
2 
assignment occurred after December 1, 1986 and argued that the acts 
of the assignee materially prejudiced Plaintiff and therefore it 
was improper to dismiss the case. 
4. Plaintiff further objects to the proposed Findings of 
Fact on the basis that it does not include a factual statement 
regarding the Court's reliance on the Court record and not on 
Defendant's Motions or pleadings in dismissing this case with 
prejudice. As Plaintiff argued, Defendant filed no affidavits in 
support of the Motion to Dismiss. T^he Court clearly stated that 
it was relying on judicial notice of the matters in the file and 
implicitly dismissed this matter upon its own motion subsequent to 
Plaintiff's filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. In addition, Plaintiff further objects on the basis that 
there is no mention of the Court's finding that it would not or 
could not exercise equitable powers to limit the collection of 
interest by Plaintiff due to alleged prejudicial delay. 
THEREFORE, based upon these objections, Plaintiff hereby 
requests the Court to consider the objection of Plaintiff and to 
modify the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
proposed Order to be consistent with the true findings by the Court 
and to include all findings made by the Court at the hearing on 
March 11, 1991 at 10:00 a.m. 
3 
DATED this 2 7,-/, day of March, 1991. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
ML A 
MayFsTswan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Copper State Thrift & Loan 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^D 7 1 4" day of February., 1991, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following by placing the same in the United States mails, 
postage paid and addressed as follows: 
Robert A. Echard 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
- l^tWiJxJ^ 
CS892702.C91 
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
801-621-3317 
Fax: 801-621-3340 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and 
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00 
a.m. The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark 
S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and 
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court having 
heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and 
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the 
premises; now therefore, makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Complaint in this action was filed in April of 
1985 seeking to collect from the defendant, Kim C. Moore, pursuant 
to an agreement guarantying a lease between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, Carver Hunter, Inc. The plaintiff had repossessed the 
property which was security for the lease and sought to obtain a 
deficiency judgment against Kim C. Moore with interest at the rate 
of 18 percent per annum. 
2. On the 1st day of December, 1986, an Order to Show 
Cause was issued by the court requiring the parties to show cause 
why the Complaint should not be dismissed for failing to prosecute 
and a hearing on said motion was set for January 7, 1987. 
3. The plaintiff wrote a letter to the court dated 
December 15, 1986, in which the plaintiff committed itself to 
proceed with the case as soon as possible and with due diligence. 
4. Thereafter, no change was made in the pleadings and 
no further action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint until the 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 19, 
1990. The court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment could 
have been filed as of January of 1987 and that nothing changed 
between 1987 and 1990 as between the parties. 
5. The lease called for interest at the rate of 18 
percent per annum and^since 1986 has more than doubled; thereby 
causing additional cost and expense to the defendant if a judgment 
were to be obtained against him. 
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6. The plaintiff has sought to excuse its delay in 
prosecuting this case because of a bankruptcy that had been filed 
by other named defendants. Kim C. Moore did not file a bankruptcy 
and there was no federal stay order prohibiting the plaintiff from 
proceeding with its case in a timely manner. 
7. The plaintiff contends that it had assigned or 
transferred its right in the lease, which is the subject matter 
of this Complaint, to Lease West from August of 1986 to 1990. If 
that representation is true, then the lease had been assigned 
prior to the December 1, 1986 Order to Show Cause issued by this 
court and the December 15, 1986 letter from the plaintiff agreeing 
to proceed expeditiously on its case. Consequently, the court 
finds that this fact, if true, does not justify the plaintiff in 
failing to prosecute its case. 
8. The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to 
timely prosecute its case and therefore the plaintiff's Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
9. The court does not deal with the issues raised in 
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; that motion being 
moot in light of the court's ruling on the defendant's Motion for 
Dismissal. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice for failing to proceed with the prosecution of its case 
in a timely manner. 
3 
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2. The court does not rule on the issues raised by the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the same having become 
moot by reason of the court's dismissal of the action for failing 
to prosecute. ^ ^ 
DATED this 3£ day of MitfCh, 199! 
tEN^ETH RIG1 
"District Count Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned 
attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the 
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this STZ^L day of March, 1991. 
/5L^ s&^fc^*r 
"ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant Moore 
<tfVl « 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this %lf2_ day of March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and 
Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State, 
Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
LAW OFFICES 
DLEY, ECHARD 
&WARD 
15 25TH STREET 
DEN, UTAH 84401 
(801) 621-3317 
<X (801) 621-3340 
SECRETARY ft *2=. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a 
corporation, KIM C. MOORE, 
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and 
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-2626 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
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The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
defendants Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00 
a.m. The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark 
S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and 
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court having 
heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and 
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the 
premises; now therefore, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's cause of 
action is dismissed with prejudice for failing to prosecute in a 
timely manner J) 
DATED t h i s 3 ~~^day of lUxtKfir, 1 9 9 1 . 7 
e LNNE^H RIGTRUP^ 
J i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
XX-
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned 
attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing 
ORDER to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup for his signature upon the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed 
to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern 
yourself accordingly. 
DATED this _^f^v day of March, 1991. 
/ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Defendant Moore 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^^2- day of 
2 
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March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 
84111. 
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